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ABSTRACT. One of A. D. Smith’s most controversial contributions to the theory of
nationalism is his view of the role of the ethnie in the historical emergence of
nationhood. He sees the ethnie, its shared memories, myths and territorial belonging as
important conditions for stable national identities based on deep emotional
commitments, thereby arguing against radical modernist and constructivist views of
nationhood. While Smith’s view has much to recommend it, this paper argues for a
wider, more metaphorical conceptualisation of his central terms, using examples to
support the view that both kinship (ethnicity) and place (territory) – basic elements in
political identity everywhere – may be construed on the basis of diverse materials.
However, and here Smith’s interventions have been extremely valuable, the resulting
collective identity must be based on some notion of kinship and place in order to be a
national identity proper.
For many years and through an impressive number of books and journal
articles, A. D. Smith has defended his view of the ethnie or ethnic community as
the sociocultural and historical basis of modern nationalism (Smith 1986, 1991,
1995, 1998). As the readers of this journal are aware, his view is inﬂuential but
far from uncontroversial. AlreadyHansKohn (1955) distinguished between an
‘Eastern’, ethnocultural and a ‘Western’, civic form of nationalism, assuming
that only the former was based on ethnic identity. Later studies of French and
German nationalism (notably Brubaker 1992) have contrasted the conse-
quences of ius soli and ius sanguinis, indicating roughly that Frenchness can be
acquired, whereas descent determines whether or not one is to be considered a
German. While Smith’s theoretical opponent Ernest Gellner (1983, 1997)
agrees with the view that ethnic groups formed the basis of nations – somewhat
surprisingly, given his gargantuan emphasis on their constructed nature – the
equally inﬂuential Benedict Anderson (1983) does not posit such a connection.
Several of his main examples, such as Indonesia and the Philippines, were not
based on a pre-existing ethnie. Current views of possible nations which are
immediately relevant to the question of its relationship to ethnicity, include
Habermas’ notion ofVerfassungspatriotismus – constitutional patriotism – and
Kymlicka’s (1995) concept of multicultural citizenship.
The perspective that will be developed here consists in an attempt to
overcome the divide between constructivism and primordialism. Just as it can
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be said that in political philosophy, the liberals have the best arguments while
the communitarians have the best social theory, I shall argue that
primordialists (or ‘perennialists’) are right in claiming that community and
shared memories are crucial for the formation of national sentiment, while the
constructivist emphasis on creativity in conjuring nations into existence is
pertinent inasmuch as sentiments of national solidarity can be grown from
diverse seedlings, perhaps even sometimes from hybrid germs.
The issue
When A. D. Smith began his research on nationalism, the important academic
subculture favouring Marxism and class consciousness seemed to be its most
potent alternative; in the early twenty-ﬁrst century, the challenge comes from a
much more general tendency in social theory to emphasise change and
movement, the relativity of boundaries, the multiplicity of identities and
internal diversity, sacriﬁcing cohesion, stability, homogeneity and structure as
key concepts. It is as if the main research tool in much contemporary research
on identiﬁcation consists in a bifocal magnifying glass precluding general-
isations and overviews, and favouring minutely detailed accounts of variations
and nuances. This has certainly been a dominant tendency in social
anthropology, while general social theorists have for years singled out
globalisation and differentiation as current academic heartlands. Yet Smith’s
position on nationalism remains largely unchanged although he has qualiﬁed
his view on the ethnie-nation relation somewhat since The Ethnic Origin of
Nations; for example, in his recent work he makes it quite clear that he does not
question the strength of and ‘overarching’ American nationalism (Smith 1995:
45), and he accepts that the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism
can be a useful one (e.g. Smith 1998: 212). His theory has nonetheless resisted
the temptations from postmodern and postcolonial theories of identiﬁcation,
European integrationism and theories of globalisation and deterritorialisation.
Sometimes cast as a primordialist, Smith has always argued that there is
continuity between modern nations and a pre-modern past, and that successful
national identities presuppose an ethnie at their core, that is a historically
shaped collective identity incorporating myths of shared origins and cultural
sharing. He strongly rejects predictions about the imminent transcendence of
nationhood, whether they are based on materialist reasoning (a view
represented by Eric Hobsbawm) or on logical arguments about the impossi-
bility of national cohesion in a world which is increasingly recognised as being
inﬁnitely diverse (as witnessed in Homi Bhabha’s work, see Smith 1998).
Smith’s position is not only admirable for its resilience; it is also
underpinned by his voluminous and rich writings on nationalism, where he,
in addition to presenting empirical cases and developing theory, explicitly
discusses alternative accounts of nationalism. His erudition and lucidity make
it consistently rewarding to engage with his theorising about nationalism.
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Clearly, Smith is correct in assuming that national sentiment and solidarity
cannot be created ex nihilo. As Anderson (1991/1983) pointed out, national
identity has more in common with phenomena such as kinship and religion
than with secular political ideologies. The question is whether the emotional
glue that binds nations together has to be ethnic in character, or whether there
are alternative roads to national sentiment. I thus leave questions pertaining to
the future of national identity aside, and will also refrain from a discussion of
equally important questions concerning multiple identities, transnationalism
and ambiguities in national identiﬁcation, concentrating instead narrowly on
the notion of the ethnie and its possible emotional and functional equivalents.
What is the ethnie?
In his Ethnic Origins of Nations, Smith (1986: 22 – 30, see also Smith 1989)
usefully presents an overview of six constituent elements or ‘dimensions’ of the
ethnie as he sees it.
1 A collective name. Smith is right in emphasising the importance of
ethnonyms for group identity; but of course, many named groups in the
past have not qualiﬁed as ethnic ones–in many African societies documented
in anthropological studies, people identiﬁed themselves largely through clan
membership–and many African ethnonyms were superimposed colonial
categories, lumping linguistically and culturally related groups together,
which were later reiﬁed and internalised by the people in question (see e.g.
Fardon 1987). In the present world, too, there are naturally many named
groups which are not ethnic ones. ‘Muslims’ is one. ‘Bavarians’ is another.
‘Social anthropologists’, I suppose, is a third, although it very rarely (all too
rarely?) functions as a corporate entity.
2 A common myth of descent. This is obviously an important criterion of
ethnic identity. Smith elaborates the point by saying that there ‘are myths of
spatial and temporal origins, of migration, of ancestry and ﬁliation, of the
golden age, of decline and exile and rebirth’. As Leach (1954) famously
showed in his study of Kachin–Shan politics, and many have followed his
lead, these myths tend to be ambiguous in that different groups can be
constituted in different ways depending on the interpretation of the myth.
Since Smith mentions India, it is worthwhile to mention that the recent
Hindu nationalist interpretation of the Ramayana as an epic focusing on the
struggle between good and evil (viz. Hindus and Muslims) is deeply
contested among Hindus and other Indians (see e.g. van der Veer 1994).
3 A shared history. Unlike many other authors (e.g. Tonkin et al. 1989), Smith
distinguishes between myths and ‘shared memories’. He seems to argue that
the latter refer to real events, unlike the former; but myths are often believed
in, and history–folk or academic–always contains important elements of
narrative creativity. As he points out, histories can be divisive just like
myths, and it is difﬁcult to see any fundamental difference.
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4 A distinctive shared culture. This is a problematic notion. Indeed, as Smith’s
own examples show, it is a purely empirical question what is considered and
accepted as ‘shared culture’ in the context of group identity. It can be
language, it can be religion, or a particular historical experience (such as
racism or migration) which is externalised as the cultural emblem of a group,
or it could be a unique combination of cultural elements as witnessed in
Bangladesh, where the vast majority of inhabitants are unique in that they
are Bengali speakers (like Bengali Hindus) and Muslims (like Indian
Muslims).
5 An association with a speciﬁc territory. This is obviously relevant for the
kind of group identity in question, but territorial claims are problematic to
deal with in practice owing to migration, mixing and competing claims to the
same territory.
6 A sense of solidarity. This is clearly the most important criterion of ethnic
identity. Seeing oneself as culturally distinctive, collectively and individually,
from other groups, and acting accordingly, is crucial for ethnic identiﬁcation
to endure.
Smith’s delineation of the ethnie, which he assumes to lie at the foundation
of nations, is rather more substantial than common anthropological deﬁnitions
of ethnicity, which tend to emphasise formal elements, notably the relationship
with outsiders, as key factors creating both group boundedness and an
awareness of cultural difference (Barth 1969; Eriksen 2002[1993]). Contrasting
vis-a`-vis others is seen, in this intellectual tradition, as the constitutive element
of ethnicity. Smith’s emphasis on the substantial elements of sharing and
internal solidarity represents an important corrective to those who are
tempted, following simplistic interpretations of Anderson and Hobsbawm, to
see ethnic groups and nations as ‘imaginary’ (the term ‘imagined’ is often taken
to mean ‘imaginary’) and traditions as purely ‘invented’.1 The requirement of
cultural sharing also not uncontroversially emphasised by Smith, also makes
perfect sense. In the pre-modern empires, the imperial state demanded little and
gave little in return from its subjects (see Grillo 1998). Cultural pluralism could
ﬂourish. The nation-state requires a much greater degree of homogeneity, and
its citizens (who are, at least in theory, no longer subjects) demand equality,
recognising that a certain degree of cultural similarity, such as command of a
shared national language, is necessary for equality to be possible.
Does it have to be an ethnie?
A collective name; a myth of origin; other shared myths/histories; cultural
sharing; association with a territory; subjective sense of solidarity: These are
Smith’s deﬁning criteria of the ethnie. He later elaborates ways in which ethnies
can be turned into nations in the modern world; this will not occupy us here, as
I shall, as announced, investigate whether or not other kinds of group can be
functional equivalents of ethnic ones in producing national identity. Again, it
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must be stressed that I am not concerned with the future of the nation-state, its
moral legitimacy in the modern world and its alternatives (see Eriksen 1997 for
a discussion), but with the question concerning possible foundations for
national sentiment and identiﬁcation.
For the sake of clarity, I shall deal with each of Smith’s criteria separately.
First, a collective name or ethnonym. As mentioned above, there are
many non-ethnic collective labels which evoke strong sentiments among
their members. The question is whether they can serve as the basis for
nationhood. The term ‘American’ seems to be one such, ‘Muslim’ another in
the context of Pakistan, since the main (only?) reason that Pakistanis are not
Indians is that they are Muslims. The term ‘Pakistan’ is itself a modern
construction, and it is doubtful if Pakistanis had felt a strong national loyalty
without the enmity and competition towards India. In other words, many
options will do here.
Second, a myth of origin. In European countries, myths of origin tend to be
ethnic, but not invariably so. The French myth of Clovis I, the ﬁrst Christian
king of the Franks, is a spiritual myth more than a genealogical one.
Appropriately, it was a French intellectual, Ernest Renan (1982 [1882]), who
said that the inhabitants of a nation need shared memories, but they also need
to have forgotten the same things. In the same, justly celebrated essay, Renan
also pointed out that ‘racial considerations haveybeen for nothing in the
constitution of modern nations’, adding – much to the exasperation of racial
purists – that France, Germany, Italy and Britain were all ‘undecipherable
medleys’ of peoples.
In general, ethnic groups have myths of descent, even if they are often
ambiguous and contested. Do nations need myths of descent or of origins? I
have earlier argued that nations may thrive on myths of the future (Eriksen
1993), but they also need a shared past. However, this past can be near as well
as distant. In Mauritius, a plausible myth of origin is the story of the ethnic
riots in the late 1960s, ‘the riots to end all riots;2in South Africa, the long
struggle against racial segregation and apartheid has proven to be a powerful
myth of origin for important segments of the otherwise ethnically diverse
population. There is no logical reason why the mythomoteur often referred to
by Smith that is the constitutive myth of the ethnic polity, should necessarily
create an ethnic group rather than another kind of corporate entity. Again, the
postcolonial nations probably give the best examples of alternative, non-
biological myths of origin as opposed to biological myths of descent. Another
example would be theMuslims ofMauritius (Eriksen 1998). Although they are
of North Indian descent, and share their migration history with Mauritian
Hindus, the Pan-Arabism of the 1970s led the majority of Mauritian Muslims
to redeﬁne their origins in religious terms. In the 1983 Census, most of them
claimed that their ‘ancestral language’ was not Urdu or Bhojpuri, but Arabic.
Confronting aMuslim informant with this ‘obvious falsehood’, I was given the
answer that ‘we admit that we came from India in a physical sense, but
spiritually, our ancestral language is Arabic, and to aMuslim, the spirit is more
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important than the ﬂesh’. Who is prepared to argue with that? The style of
reasoning is reminiscent of General de Gaulle’s famous dictum that ‘France is
not a race, but an idea’.3
Third, there is the question of shared memories. Shared collective
experiences, codiﬁed through narratives which are accessible to the members
of the group, are clearly immensely important in the shaping of group identities
(and again I agree with Smith at the general level). The refashioning of nations
following the upsurge of minority movements, new waves of migration,
feminism and postcolonial critiques indicates that the form of content such
memories should take is contested, and that they can be re-shaped to ﬁt present
concerns (see Hutchinson 1994 for examples). That the memory of certain
iconic events in the past need to be shared by the members of a nation is
probably true, but they need not belong to a distant past. In Norway, the
memory of German occupation during the Second World War did much to
consolidate the sense of national identity, and since it is the only remotely
tragic narrative in Norwegian history since the fourteenth century, it plays a
signiﬁcant part in contemporary Norwegian identity.
Then there is the difﬁcult question of shared culture. A degree of sharing is
obviously necessary, not least in polyethnic societies, in order to avoid
segregation along ethnic lines, which is always a recipe for competition, mutual
suspicion and conﬂict. The question is, howmuch is enough? Howmuch do the
citizens of a given state have to have in common, culturally speaking, in order
to form a nation? One thing is for certain, namely that cultural commonalities
are not sufﬁcient. The recent histories of culturally rather homogeneous
countries like Rwanda, Yugoslavia and Somalia4 bear witness to this.
Moreover, cultural commonalities can be achieved, and are achieved –
through education, shared mass media and everyday interaction – by people
with discrete origins. National sentiment is rather widespread and strong in a
country such as Argentina (Archetti 1999), where it is based on shared
migration history, but also on cultural expressions such as the tango, polo and
football, as well as cultural practices such as the asado (large-scale barbecue).
Again, as Calhoun points out in a discussion of the Eritrean – Ethiopian war, it
was ‘not the antiquity of Eritrean nationalism that mattered in mobilising
people against Ethiopian rule,ybut the felt reality of Eritreanness’ (Calhoun
1997: 35). Eritrean identity is neither historically ancient nor ethno-religious,
and during the war, members of the same clan fought on different sides. The
importance of trivial everyday experiences – currency, TV news, ﬂags in the
street, tipping conventions, conversational styles etc. – has rarely been
investigated systematically in studies of nationalism (but see Billig 1995), but
contribute substantially to the development of that ‘felt reality’. Everyday
trivia often goes without saying because it comes without saying, and shared
implicit conventions and notions, or taken-for-granteds, create a sense of
community which is linked with space rather than time; sharing the same space
rather than entertaining notions of shared origins. The moment the children of
immigrants begin to speak the vernacular language without a foreign accent, it
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becomes increasingly difﬁcult for populist politicians to brand them as
‘culturally alien’.
Territoral belonging, or at least some association with a territory, is the ﬁfth
criterion. With very few exceptions, all the cultural groups known to
anthropology have some attachment to a territory or landscape. This is as
true of nomads as of farmers, industrial workers and computer programmers.
The form of belonging naturally varies, and the ﬁxed polity marked by clear,
digital, pencil-thin boundaries – citizens inside, foreigners outside – is amodern
invention; but place has played a part throughout human cultural history.
Mass migration has more often than not been born out of necessity not choice.
In the contemporary world, many nonetheless belong not in one place but
either in a metaphoric place but in two or more places. Transnational migrants
exemplify the latter; Western ‘experts’ and businessmen the former. Enclaves
of Western modernity scattered around the world, incorporating satellite TV,
American and French schools, Internet access and cheap air tickets, imply that
‘the West’ (or even ‘the USA’) has been deterritorialised to some extent. The
main current problem in US foreign policy is that inasmuch as the present
regime wishes to pursue the traditional policy of isolationism, defence of
American interests and indeed the USA as such seems to imply the necessity of
global control, since the USA is everywhere by virtue of its overseas business
communities and global economic interests.
More generally, territoriality is seen in many studies of nationalism as a
complementary or opposing force to kinship or ethnic identity. Since,
according to nationalist ideals, cultural and territorial boundaries ought to
coincide, and since they hardly ever do in practice, questions of national
identity often concern their mutual relationship: Is one a member of a nation
by virtue of a shared ethnic identity/origin, or by virtue of living in the same
place (that is, in this context, the same state)? To ethnic nationalists in, say,
Norway who argue that immigrants are ‘matter out of place’ and ought to be
sent back, it may be responded that according to their view of nationhood, four
and a half million Norwegian live in Norway proper, but some eight to ten
million Norwegians – the descendants of emigrants – live abroad, largely in
North America. Such a reductio ad absurdum of ethnic nationalist claims
shows, at the very least, that several forces are at play in shaping national
identiﬁcation, imputed biological origins being only one. This being as it may,
territorial identiﬁcation is deﬁnitely an important aspect of national identity;
but it can be acquired through migration and settlement, as is evident in the
New World, but also among immigrant communities in Europe who claim
belonging to particular urban areas. Moreover, territoriality is metaphorical
since the nation is an abstract place. In somemigrant communities, attachment
to the place of origin remains strong even among persons of the second or third
generation, who have never been there (see Olwig 1997 for migrants from
Nevis). Moreover, the studies presented in a recent book on movement and
mixing (Rapport and Dawson 1998a) all in various ways conﬁrm that if
movement is endemic to the human condition, so is placeboundness. In the
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explicitly polemical introductory chapter, the editors ﬁrst conclude that
‘human beings conceive of their lives as moving-in-between’, before ending the
sentence with the words ‘a dialectic between movement and ﬁxity’ (Rapport
and Dawson 1998b: 33). In the possibly most extreme case study presented in
the book, Amit-Talai (1998) describes uprooted expatriates working in the
Cayman Islands, unable or unwilling to return home and yet unable to settle in
the archipelago permanently, for professional and political reasons. She depicts
Cayman society as a transit place, more like an airport than like a town, where
expatriates are weakly integrated in the local social systems and voice concerns
over their lack of spatial belonging, contrasting their expat lives with ‘reality’. If
movement is endemic to humanity (and I think it is), then so is spatial identity: It
can be dual, metaphorical, big (the USA) or small (a particular neighbourhood
in north London), but there is little evidence to suggest that collective and
societal identities can thrive without a spatial referent.
The ﬁnal criterion is the subjective sense of identity. This is presumed to be
the outcome of the other factors, and whether or not it exists is an empirical
question, but it certainly helps if the ﬁve other requirements are satisﬁed in one
way or another. So far, the discussion has indicated that Smith’s list of factors
deﬁning the ethnie is accurate, but also that these elements need not produce
ethnies but can also produce other kinds of collectivities based on ascription.
The concept of the ethnie seems too rigid, and too bound up with la longue
dure´e and native ideas of bloodlines, to accommodate the entire range of
functioning imagined communities. In the words of Brubaker (1998: 301),
‘counter-state deﬁnitions of the nation may be based on territory, on historical
provincial privileges, on distinct political histories prior to incorporation into a
larger state and so on’. A certain conceptual ﬂexibility is therefore needed, but
it is necessary to resist the temptation to conclude that anything goes. As Smith
usefully reminds us there are clear constraints, and to his list of six (or possibly
ﬁve, if we combine myth and memories) I shall add another two.
Two further dimensions of national identity
One factor which is crucial in shaping community sentiment, rarely considered
by sociologists and political scientists writing about ethnicity and nationalism,
is that of interpersonal networks. The raw material upon which every abstract
ideology has to build is everyday experience. The family, the environment of
socialisation and the bonds of mutual commitment and trust developed
through endless encounters and acts of reciprocity create that sense of ‘cultural
intimacy’ (Herzfeld 1997) which includes insiders at the expense of excluding
the outsiders from any group, whether this takes place consciously or
unwittingly. The sense of kinship felt by well integrated members of any nation
grows out of shared experiences (the cultural commonalities discussed above),
but trust is developed through enduring interaction. The extent to which social
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interaction networks cut across ethnic boundaries determines to no small
extent the degree of shared national sentiment in polyethnic societies.
In an evaluation of the ‘primordial sentiments’ militating against the new
postcolonial states, Geertz once wrote: ‘One is bound to one’s kinsman, one’s
neighbor, one’s fellow believer, ipso facto; as the result not merely of personal
affection, practical necessity, common interest, or incurred obligation, but at
least in great part by virtue of some unaccountable absolute import attributed to
the very tie itself’ (Geertz 1963: 108, my italics). Verging on mysticism, this
statement amounts to an intellectual abdication. But clearly, the ‘absolute’
dimension of the tie referred to by Geertz is nothing but that sense of being in
the same boat and living in the same world, with a shared destiny, which results
from regular interaction, small exchanges and mutual courtesies, webs of
kinship and neighbourly relations. In a word, strong interpersonal ties are far
from unaccountable, but derive from the nature of social interaction and local
organisation.5
The other factor is contrasting, which frequently takes the form of negative
stereotyping or enemy images of other nations, but which is also omnipresent
in everyday arenas such as international sport. Having something in common
doubtless helps, but there is also nothing like a common enemy. In the days
after 11 September 2001, there were newspaper reports of African-American
youths helping old Jewish ladies across the street. Colonial India, to pick
another example almost at random, achieved a shared, if precarious (and
ultimately doomed) collective identity across a space of huge cultural
differences largely because of the shared opposition to the British. Partition,
which came on the eve of independence and dampened enthusiasm on every
side of the new borders, was not predicated on the Pakistanis having a shared
ethnic identity – the Punjabi and the Bengali ethnic groups were actually both
divided by partition – but on religion.
National discourses depend crucially on contrasting, which is more
widespread than commonly assumed. Take the language of tourism: tourism
boards worldwide offer carefully edited, standardised images of the country in
question, singling out a few salient elements – Constable country and
Buckingham Palace; Grand Canyon and Disneyworld; the bistro and the
Eiffel Tower; the Kruger Park and Table Mountain – which are intended to
‘sell’ the country in question, but which also have an important internal
function in giving a sense of relational uniqueness to the country’s own citizens.
My village informants in Mauritius would probably not have thought about
showing me the coloured earths of Chamarel had they not known that this
strange freak of nature was an acknowledged tourist attraction.
Contrasting is also politically important in more immediate ways.
Polyethnic and class-divided Britain thus achieved a rare level of national
cohesion during the Falklands/Malvinas war in 1982, just as the standardised
rituals of international sport regularly enhance national solidarity, however
ﬂeetingly.We are not only because we have something in common, but perhaps
chieﬂy because we are not them. Afrikaner group identity in South Africa
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would obviously have beenmuchweaker if it had not been developed through a
hierarchical contrast in relation to other Africans; innumerable other examples
could have been invoked to illustrate the same point. Contrasting is not,
moreover, merely a political instrument intended to create loyalty and internal
homogeneity; it is equally important as a means to achieve recognition in
Taylor’s (1992, 1998) sense.
Place, kinship and nationhood
Smith’s emphasis on shared narratives and territorial belonging as prerequi-
sites for national solidarity is obviously pertinent. Supplemented with an
understanding of social networks, trust and reciprocity, it is sufﬁcient as a
analytical framework for explaining why communities (which are all in a sense
imagined) appear, endure and eventually are transformed or vanish. The
question remains whether these communities need to have an ethnic foundation
in order to function as nations. To my mind, this would entail stretching the
concept of ethnic identity too far. I have therefore argued that there are several
ways in which the requirements of nationhood can be met, and that shared
ethnic identity is only one, even if it has historically been themost important one.
It is often said that the nation is based on the dual, European heritage of the
Enlightenment and Romanticism. The nation can also be said to be connected
tomore universal dimensions of human existence. Virtually all political identities
known to political anthropology are based, in different ways and to varying
degrees of course, on place and kinship. The two principles often compete and
create divided loyalties (see Gluckman, 1982[1956], for a famous presentation of
this view), and there are good reasons to assume that patrilineal corporate
groups, which fuse political loyalty, inheritance rules and patterns of settlement
into one principle, tend to be politically stronger than – all other things being
equal – matrilineal or cognatic descent groups, where the principles of place and
kinship do not concur. The nation, too, is based on the dual principles of place
and kinship, and just as in the traditional African society, they are rarely if ever
completely congruent, they compete and lead to divided loyalties.
This much said, it is crucial to keep in mind that both place and kinship are,
certainly in the case of huge entities such as nations (with the possible
exceptions of countries on the scale of Nauru and Nevis), metaphorical. The
sociobiologist Pierre Van Den Berghe, who sees ethnic solidarity as an
expression of kin selection,6 thus nearly gets it right (Van Den Berghe 1981).
Kinship and territoriality are very powerful forces indeed in shaping human
group identiﬁcation. What is missing in the sociobiological account is an
appreciation of the metaphorical nature of human communities.
The force of nationhood depends on the national ideology’s ability to
transfer the sentiments and commitments of citizens from their personal
experiences to that abstract and imagined community called the nation. When
national leaders use kinship terminology (‘brothers and sisters’, ‘fatherland’,
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‘homeland’, ‘mother tongue’ and so on) to designate features of the abstract
community which is the nation, they are busy carrying out this work. It could
thus be said that the nation expropriates the personal sentiments and
experiences of its citizens, transferring them to the much larger and loftier
stage of the nation. It is in this sense that a Serb could refer, in the heady 1990s,
to the 1389 battle of Kosovo in the ﬁrst person: ‘We [the kin group] lost the
battle to the inﬁdels, and we are not going to lose Kosovo again.’ It is in the
same sense that a crime committed against a member of one’s nation is
perceived as a crime against one’s family members. The rape of a Croatian girl
at the hands of Serbian soldiers somewhere in Croatia could justify ‘revenge’
carried out by any Croat against any Serb, as in a clan feud writ large.
However, the metaphoric kin group of ‘Americans’ is not based on a folk
sociobiological model of origins, yet it can be equally strong. Nations need not
have ‘navels’ (Gellner 1997) even if it helps, and if they do not, they can
sometimes create appropriate ‘navels’ retrospectively.
The nation is, thus, not a kin group but a metaphoric kin group. Similarly,
the nation is not a place, but a metaphoric place. As wryly pointed out byMiller
and Slater (2000), Trinidad does not stop at the coastline of insular Trinidad,
but stretches into England, Canada and the USA, which are the countries with
the largest Trinidadian immigrant populations. If anything, Trinidadian
migrants feel more Trini than the ones who stay put. The everyday abstract
image of the nation, taught to children through school atlases and tomillions of
adults through daily weather forecasts, is another example. Nations (again with
a couple of exceptions) as physical entities cannot be observed directly; the
citizens have to infer their existence from abstractions such as maps.
None of the above is intended to mean that nations are not real, only that
their reality hinges on the efﬁcacy of social constructions relating citizens to
one another through ﬁctive kinship, and creating a fatherland through
geographical abstractions. In this dual way, the nation can be imagined as a
metaphorical kin group residing in a metaphorical place.
The crucial question remains to be answered unequivocally: Under which
circumstances do metaphoric kinship and metaphoric place of the national
kinds function? This is, I hope to have shown, an entirely empirical question.
Kinship, as generations of anthropologists have shown us (beginning, for all
practical purposes, with Le´vi-Strauss 1949), is not merely about descent and
blood lines; it is also about alliances and afﬁnality. In-laws are kin. Women
from outside marry into kin groups. Just as it is theoretically possible for
anybody to become a ‘naturalised’ American or Frenchman, rules of exogamy
ensure that outsiders are allowed permanent entry into the villages of
traditional kin groups. This is not to say that they are entirely open, of course –
African peoples have their marriage rules just as Western countries have limits
to immigration – but that a shared ethnic identity is not a necessary condition
for nationhood.
Exactly who is reckoned as a member of the metaphoric kin group depends
on its rules of inclusion and its founding myth. New World societies tend to
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have founding myths of immigration (as in the case of Argentina), of mixing or
mestizaje (as in the case of Mexico) or of anti-colonial struggles (as in the case
of Jamaica). Old world societies, especially in Europe, tend to have founding
myths of shared origins. However, neither the majority ofMuslim states nor, of
course, African states ﬁt easily into this model. Malays are taught allegiance to
their ethnic group and to the universal brotherhood of Islam. The polyethnic
Malaysian state is thus relegated to an uncomfortably marginal intermediate
position. Osama bin Laden’s anti-American campaign, moreover, is not a
struggle for national liberation (notwithstanding his contempt for the rulers of
Saudi Arabia), but a religious struggle. In Africa, there is no doubt that ethnic
diversity has emerged as a major source of conﬂict. However, the bloodiest
conﬂict on the continent in the last couple of decades pitted two groups against
each other who were culturally as similar as Croats and Serbs, or for that
matter, Eastern Norwegians and Western Norwegians. The Hutus and Tutsis
speak the same language and adhere to the same religion. Most Tutsis are
sedentary like the Hutus, although their ancestors were pastoralists. Shared
culture did not help. Just as in the case of ex-Yugoslavia, culturally similar
groups fought bitterly against each other. For a third African example,
contemporary South African national identity is deeply based on the struggle
against apartheid. In spite of its incomplete integration of all ethnic groups in
the country (many problems of identity and loyalty remain to be handled), it
cannot be said to be ethnic in any conventional sense of the word. However, it is
based on the shared memory of a series of transforming experiences, which
thus serve to unite people who are otherwise quite different. The force of a
founding myth makes itself felt very strongly indeed.
Place and kinship are nevertheless the prime movers in human collective
identiﬁcation. Living in the same place (physically or metaphorically) entails
the acquisition of a wide range of shared skills and notions. During a debate
about Norwegian nationhood, I once proposed, as a possible deﬁnition, that a
Norwegian was someone who lived in Norway and had heard about Henrik
Wergeland (a mid-nineteenth century poet known to all Norwegian school-
children but to no foreigners). The importance of such shared frames of
reference is the reason why no clear-cut distinction between ethnocultural and
civic nationalism holds water, as correctly pointed out by Smith (1995: 99). No
functioning civic nationalism can be entirely divorced from cultural sharing,
but as I have shown, this sharing does not necessarily need to refer to ethnic
identity. Regarding kinship, I have emphasised its variable nature and its
metaphoric functioning in nationhood, but it is difﬁcult to ﬁnd an enduring
corporate group which does not draw on a notion of relatedness, whether
biological or not, in its collective imagery and ideology. The other features
listed by Smith – myth, memories, commonalities, subjective feeling of we-
hood – follow from place and kinship. Whether or not the resulting
collectivities are eventually turned into nations is, of course, another question.
The above argument suggests that the analytical perspective developed by
Smith in his writings about nationalism is valid at an abstract level, but that his
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linking of the traditional ethnie and the modern nation is unnecessarily
substantial and rules out functional equivalents of ethnies. Is this merely a
question of terminology? I should think not. It is only when we see that there
are empirically functioning alternatives to the ethnic nation that it becomes
possible to imagine existing nations as alternative kinds of imagined
communities, based not on ﬁctional bloodlines and shared history but on
shared futures and multiple pasts; but by the same token, it is only when we
heed Smith’s words of caution that we understand that the range of options is
limited by human experience and, indeed, by human nature.
Notes
Thanks to Aleksandar Boskovic for comments on an earlier version.
1 Surprisingly many of those who have commented on Imagined Communities (Anderson 1983)
and The Invention of Tradition (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983) have failed to see that Anderson
emphasises, on one of the very ﬁrst pages of the book, that not only nations, butmost communities
are imagined and abstract (which is not to say that they are imaginary), and that Hobsbawm and
(especially) Ranger describe invented traditions as a particular subset of traditions, typically
created by colonial powers to subjugate and dupe subject populations, incidentally rarely successful
in achieving this.
2 As it happened, riots broke out again brieﬂy in 1999.
3 De Gaulle’s motivation for saying this, in the mid-1950s, was clearly to tell Algerians that they
had no business demanding independence, since they were de facto French.
4 Yugoslavia and Rwanda were culturally relatively homogeneous, but they were of course not
ethnically homogeneous.
5 An important anthropological account of the relationship between social networks, symbols
and community is Cohen’s (1985)The Symbolic Construction of Community, which concentrates on
local and regional, rather than ethnic and national, forms of community.
6 Kin selection is the process, predicted in Hamilton’s Rule (Hamilton 1964), whereby close
genetic kin support each other because they share most of their genes. If I am infertile, I should thus
help to ensure that my siblings and cousins have fertile offspring. The problem with this kind of
model, if taken in a literal sense, is that human kinship practices are highly variable and selective.
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